Organized Crime and National Security

A long-standing line between organised crime and terrorism is being erased. The shift snapped into focus when the United States struck a suspected drug-smuggling boat in the Caribbean linked to Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua (TdA), killing 11 alleged traffickers and prompting Venezuelan military fly-bys over a U.S. destroyer. Washington cast the action not as a one-off interdiction but as the opening move in a sustained campaign against “narco-terrorists.”

In parallel, on 20 January 2025 the administration enabled cartels and other criminal groups to be designated both as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs)—and then formally listed several, including TdA. That decision fuses criminal, financial and counterterrorism authorities, raising the stakes for facilitators and signalling a willingness to normalise extraterritorial action against transnational crime groups.

“Washington is recasting cartels from fugitives to combatants—bringing terrorism laws and military tools to the counternarcotics fight.”

What changed—and why it matters

With FTO status, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B material-support prohibitions now apply to designated cartels. That widens exposure for money-handlers, shippers, shell-company owners and other intermediaries who “knowingly” assist them. Combined with Kingpin Act sanctions, the package harmonises financial pressure with criminal liability and opens the door to more assertive operations overseas. The outcome is a higher compliance bar for networks that once treated narcotics exposure as a calculable risk.

Operationally, the administration is importing post-9/11 high-value targeting logic into counternarcotics. Intelligence, surveillance and precision-strike options are being prepared for use against cartel leadership and logistics nodes—an approach explicitly compared to past campaigns against al-Qaeda and ISIS. The early Caribbean strike is the template: maritime and air assets, tight ISR, and rapid authorities.

The legal frame: a narrow, contested path

Internationally, Washington’s case leans on Article 51 self-defence and the “unable or unwilling” doctrine: cartels are treated as non-state actors mounting an ongoing armed campaign whose cross-border violence and fentanyl-driven death toll justify action if host states cannot or will not act. Critics warn this reading stretches sovereignty norms and creates precedents other powers could cite for their own cross-border operations.

Domestically, the picture is equally tight. The President’s Article II powers are engaged, but Congress has not passed a tailored Authorization for Use of Military Force against cartels. Inside U.S. borders, the Posse Comitatus Act limits direct military law-enforcement roles. Result: a legal needle to thread—scope for strikes abroad, but strict constraints at home unless Congress steps in with explicit authority.

Venezuela’s central role

Venezuela is not incidental; it is structural to the problem set. U.S. Treasury and Justice actions over years have mapped overlaps among regime-linked elites, security services and trafficking networks—captured in Kingpin Act designations and U.S. indictments tied to figures such as Tareck El Aissami and financier Samark López. The Cartel de los Soles, involving elements of the security apparatus, has been repeatedly cited for enabling cocaine flows and colluding with foreign groups, with sanctions expanded in July 2025 that referenced links to TdA and Mexican cartels.

This is also where terror finance meets narco-logistics. U.S. cases and sanctions actions have documented Hezbollah-linked laundering and facilitation through Latin American nodes touching Venezuela—contested in scale but persistent in the record. In 2024, RAND urged naming Venezuela a State Sponsor of Terrorism; while that step has not been taken, the new FTO posture already treats Caracas as a permissive hub where tolerated traffickers make the country a legitimate theatre for counter-threat operations.

Strategic and regional implications

Expect a more visible U.S. maritime and air posture across the Caribbean Basin, tighter intelligence-sharing and joint targeting cells with partners such as Colombia and Ecuador, and more frequent close-contact incidents with regimes that host or tolerate cartel infrastructure. Venezuelan overflights of a U.S. warship after the TdA-linked strike are an early warning of escalation risk.

Allies are split. Some will quietly welcome the deterrent effect; others will view cross-border strikes on criminal groups as a challenge to sovereignty and non-intervention norms. Human-rights litigation and diplomatic disputes are likely, testing Washington’s ability to justify an expanded doctrine while maintaining regional coalitions.

The approach also pressures Nicolás Maduro’s regime and its external patrons by squeezing revenue streams from the Cartel de los Soles and TdA networks. That could disrupt Hezbollah- and Iran-linked finance that exploits Venezuelan nodes—but proxy retaliation, cyber operations and maritime harassment are plausible counters. Strategy durability will hinge on whether Congress codifies parts of this approach and funds sanctions enforcement, maritime assets and partner capacity.

What to watch next

• Authorisation politics. Does Congress move toward a tailored AUMF or continue to rely on Article II, inviting legal challenges and policy reversals under a future administration?
• Operational tempo. Do high-value targeting and maritime interdictions expand beyond the Caribbean? Watch for ISR surges, multilateral tasking and new rules of engagement signals.
• Venezuelan leverage. How far does Caracas escalate—through military posturing, proxy facilitation or diplomatic obstruction—when its logistics and finance nodes are hit?
• Legal and norms contest. Expect sovereignty-based objections at the OAS and UN, plus human-rights suits. Precedent-setting cases will have knock-on effects well beyond the hemisphere.

If you need a deeper brief on the legal, operational or regional angles—or a tabletop exercise on spillover risks to personnel, logistics and compliance—get in touch and we’ll tailor a session for your leadership team.